The Self as Story: Narrative Identity and Its Discontents
We tell ourselves we are the authors of our lives. But the neuroscience of memory suggests the narrator is unreliable β and perhaps always β¦
Read more βProfessor of Cognitive Science & Philosophy of Mind
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Β· Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences
I study how subjective experience arises from physical processes β and what the answer implies for consciousness, artificial minds, and moral status. My work bridges analytic philosophy, empirical neuroscience, and the ethics of emerging technology.
My work spans several intertwined research programs, each asking a version of the same question from a different angle.
Exploring the hard problem β why physical states give rise to subjective experience.
When, if ever, would an artificial system deserve moral consideration?
How the brain constructs a sense of self across time.
Examining the ethical terrain when we alter the mind deliberately and irreversibly.
Tracing how Descartes, Hume, James, and Husserl grappled with consciousness.
Writing for general audiences and advising on AI consciousness policy.
Selected from 12 publications. Full list on the publications page.
Longer reflections on consciousness, technology, and the philosophy of everyday mental life.
We tell ourselves we are the authors of our lives. But the neuroscience of memory suggests the narrator is unreliable β and perhaps always β¦
Read more βThe problem of qualia β why there is something it is like to see red β remains the hardest knot in the philosophy of mind. I examine why β¦
Read more βBenjamin Libet’s experiments suggested that unconscious brain activity precedes conscious decisions. Decades later, the implications β¦
Read more βI welcome correspondence from researchers, students, journalists, and anyone curious about philosophy of mind. I try to respond to all email, though it may take a few weeks during the semester.