The Self as Story: Narrative Identity and Its Discontents
We tell ourselves we are the authors of our lives. But the neuroscience of memory suggests the narrator is unreliable β and perhaps always β¦
Read more βProfessor of Cognitive Science & Philosophy of Mind
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Β· Dept. of Brain & Cognitive Sciences
I study how subjective experience arises from physical processes β and what the answer implies for consciousness, artificial minds, and moral status. My work bridges analytic philosophy, empirical neuroscience, and the ethics of emerging technology.
My intellectual home is the hard problem of consciousness β the question of why physical processes give rise to inner experience at all. I approach this through three lenses: metaphysical analysis, cognitive neuroscience, and applied ethics for AI systems.
Before joining MIT, I held positions at the University of Edinburgh and the Max Planck Institute for Empirical Aesthetics. I completed my doctorate at Oxford under the supervision of Prof. John Hare, with a dissertation on higher-order theories of consciousness.
Outside the academy I write for Aeon, Nautilus, and The Atlantic, bringing philosophy of mind to broader audiences.
My work spans three intertwined research programs, each asking a version of the same question from a different angle.
Exploring the hard problem β why physical states give rise to subjective experience. I develop and defend a form of illusionism that reconceives phenomenal properties without eliminativism.
When, if ever, would an artificial system deserve moral consideration? I argue that functional integration β not substrate β is the right criterion, with significant implications for AI governance.
Collaborative empirical work on how the brain constructs a sense of self across time, including studies of dissociative disorders, meditation, and predictive processing.
Brainβcomputer interfaces, psychedelic therapies, and cognitive enhancement β examining the ethical terrain when we alter the mind deliberately and irreversibly.
Tracing how Descartes, Hume, James, and Husserl grappled with consciousness, and what their partial successes and failures still teach us about contemporary debates.
Writing for general audiences in Aeon, Nautilus, and The Atlantic; advising government bodies on AI consciousness policy; and hosting the podcast The Observing Mind.
Selected from 12 publications. Full list on the publications page.
Longer reflections on consciousness, technology, and the philosophy of everyday mental life.
We tell ourselves we are the authors of our lives. But the neuroscience of memory suggests the narrator is unreliable β and perhaps always β¦
Read more βThe question sounds like science fiction, but it demands philosophical precision. I argue that asking ‘what it’s like’ to β¦
Read more βThe question sounds like science fiction, but it demands philosophical precision. I argue that asking ‘what it’s like’ to β¦
Read more βI welcome correspondence from researchers, students, journalists, and anyone curious about philosophy of mind. I try to respond to all email, though it may take a few weeks during the semester.